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"I've got a story to tell you. 
It's all about spies. And if 
it's true, which I think it is, 
you boys are going to need a 
whole new organization." 
Thus spake Ricki Tarr, erstwhile agent of the "Circus", a moribund British 
secret service. His chilling words sent veteran superspy George Smiley in search 
of a "mole", a Soviet double agent who had burrowed deep into the heart of 
British intelligence.1 Fiction, of course, penned less than a decade after the 
author, John Le Carré, had written the introduction to a non-fiction account of 
a real mole: Kim Philby.2 Coincidence? Hardly, although the secret world is 
fraught with coincidence, irony and the extraordinary blending of fact and 
fiction. 
The irony is all the greater in this case, for while Canadians watched the 
serialized novel on television this past spring, a real life drama was being played 
out in the Canadian courts. Leslie James Bennett, former chief of counter-
intelligence in the RCMP Security Service, is suing for libel Ian Adams, author 
of S: Portrait of a Spy. RCMP Intelligence - the Inside Story? The suit alleges 
that Adams has implied in his "novel" that Bennett was a Soviet agent. Bennett 
was discharged from the Security Service in 1972 after a four-day interrogation 
raised doubts about his loyalty, but he was never officially or publically charged 
with being a spy or a traitor.4 The libel case has yet to be resolved and it would 
be inappropriate for this author to venture an opinion on it. But the Bennett case 
and its supposed fictional counterpart, like the Philby case and the Le Carré 
novel before them, highlight important issues in the current debate about the 
role of security services in open societies. This article will attempt to demystify 
that role and to identify and explain some of the issues and problems confront-
ing both the intelligence community and those who "watch the watchers." 
The Intelligence Task 
Intelligence is more than just information. It is "the product resulting from 
the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all avail-
able information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of 
areas of operation and which is immediately or potentially significant to 
military planning and operations."5 Although this definition emphasizes the 
military dimension, intelligence takes other forms — political, economic, 
technological. The principal function of intelligence is offensively to achieve and 
defensively to avert surprise. It is intended to reduce the margin of ignorance 
among national security policy makers and in that context it is, as Klaus Knorr 
observes, the continuation of politics by other means.6 Surprise can take many 
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forms, although it is generally the military form which comes first to mind. 
History is replete with examples of surprise attack, whose consequences need no 
further elaboration. Today the superpowers rely increasingly on technological 
means, such as spy satellites, to minimize the possibility of surprise attack at the 
strategic level and to ensure, by assessing visible military capabilities, that each 
is abiding by arms control agreements. In this sense, intelligence-gathering plays 
a major role in preserving world peace. But in the field of intentions, of 
determining what one's opponent thinks and plans, the satellite is of little use 
and it is here that there remains a role for the traditional spy. 
It should be emphasized that not all intelligence-gathering is, or need be, 
secret: much of what governments need to know about each other, at least in so 
far as "open" societies are concerned, may be derived from public sources. An 
effective intelligence organization will devote the largest proportion of its 
resources to analysis of material from open sources, thereby defining more 
clearly the limited areas where clandestine collection may be required. To do 
otherwise would leave the intelligence service grasping at straws in the dark, 
with no overtly verified information against which to judge material collected by 
covert means.7 Many countries, however, are "closed" and even liberal 
democracies have secrets. Truth lies protected behind layers of deliberate 
security. Nowhere is the fog of war more opaque. Consequently, as Hugh Trevor 
Roper has observed, "So long as governments conceal a part of their activities, 
other governments, if they wish to base their policy on full and correct informa-
tion, must seek to penetrate the veil."8 The United States and Soviet Union 
commit formidable resources to winkling out one another's secrets, for in the 
war called peace "the peace is only nominal. War is war, whether declared or 
not . . . menace can arrive as swiftly as the proverbial bolt from the blue; secret 
services need constantly to watch for it."9 Intelligence, then, has an important 
defensive role, and small as well as major powers are potential targets. Hence, 
the need for security in otherwise open societies. 
Role of Security Services 
The principal task of a security service is counter-espionage: to identify and 
place under surveillance the intelligence agents of hostile powers — many of 
whom operate "legally" under diplomatic cover — and, if necessary, to frustrate 
their activities. In the major capitals of the world it is a formidable task, but 
even in the relative tranquility of Ottawa the RCMP Security Service devotes 
considerable resources to surveillance of the Soviet KGB and its allied agencies, 
notably the Cuban DGI and Czechoslovak STB.10 As Michael Foot observes, 
however, outside of a tyranny manpower requirements preclude wholesale 
surveillance of all potential foreign agents." In any case, however troublesome, 
these agents are probably the easiest to deal with, simply by virtue of the fact 
that they are foreign and bear some official accreditation by which they become 
known. A far greater problem is the "illegal", a foreign agent living under 
assumed identity in the target nation. He or she may have entered the country 
some time in the past and be working in a trusted position in government or in 
some other profession which permits access to sensitive information. If unde-
tected at the point of entry, the illegals may work unmolested by the security 
service. Their only weakness is that sooner or later they may have to com-
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municate whatever information they collect to a "legal" or visible foreign agent. 
Provided the latter are under surveillance, the contact point or means of com-
munication may become known and the illegal identified, neutralized (arrested 
or deported), or even "turned" to work for the security service.12 
By far the most serious espionage threat, that suggested in the introduction to 
this article, is the mole or double agent, the trusted native son working both for 
his own intelligence or security service and that of a hostile power. Philby is, of 
course, the classic case, though he is by no means the only one. The mole poses 
three distinct threats to the host service. First, by passing information to the 
source of his true loyalty he can disrupt the activities of his assumed employers 
— their sources are betrayed, their agents captured or killed, their plans leaked 
and frustrated. It is dangerous work for a double agent since, like the illegal, he 
or she must maintain some kind of link with or conduit to the rival agency. 
Security service surveillance or information planted deliberately to identify the 
source of the leaks may lead to exposure. These risks highlight the importance 
of the second task — as "agent of influence". Le Carré notes that by designat-
ing its intelligence targets, a secret service "declares its own ignorance and 
thereby points to the areas in which it is most easily deceived."13 In this case the 
mole can inflict infinite harm with minimal risk to himself, since contact with 
the "enemy" agency is not essential. According to Edward Epstein, deception or 
"disinformation" — the product of a mole's activities — may manifest itself in 
two forms: first, by hiding, camouflaging or fabricating recognizable items of 
intelligence, a disinformation plan may induce the target agency to miscount 
observable data; secondly, where data cannot be concealed, the double agent 
may mislead or confuse the target service, causing it to misinterpret the inten-
tions of the hostile power. Since matters of motive and strategy are essentially 
intangibles dealing in shadings of meaning, the disinformation content is not 
immediately verifiable. The basic requirement for success is a "hinge of reality" 
— the material and the channels through which it comes must be credible.14 
Here the mole is at a tremendous advantage, for who will know better than he 
what his government wants to hear and is willing to believe? Moreover, the very 
nature of his intelligence responsibilities places at his disposal the technical 
means for creating disinformation and may even permit him to establish contact 
with "the hostiles" for the alleged purpose of cultivating a high grade source. 
The deception plan may extend to providing a wall of innocence around the mole 
while ensnaring an unsuspecting colleague in the web of intrigue. But even if it 
does not, or if the cover plan fails, all is not lost for even in exposure a mole may 
play a third, usually unintended, but equally valuable role. As Le Carré 
explains, "A penetrated secret service is not just a bad one; it is an appalling 
liability. In place of an all-seeing eye, it becomes a credulous ear and a mislead-
ing voice, innocently deceiving its own customers in every sphere of the national 
security."15 Penetration on the scale of Kim Philby, once exposed, completely 
discredits the hapless service in the eyes of its sources (those still alive), its 
customers and its allies, none of whom will be ready to trust and do business 
with the service again until a record of reliability has been re-established — a 
process which might take years. Ironically, then, a mole may do his greatest 
damage by being exposed or by "surfacing" voluntarily — preferably, for his 
sake, after escape to the country he served covertly. In the scandalous after-
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math, it remains only for indignant politicians and an inquisitive news media to 
finish the destruction he initiated. 
Obviously, security services take precautions to prevent foreign espionage in 
whatever form it may manifest itself. Preventive security involves essentially 
three tasks: first, physical security — the protection of government buildings 
and installations and the classified materials they contain. Positive vetting (or 
security clearance) of persons with access to classified material is the second 
task. This is intended to eliminate spies and double agents and to ensure that 
normally reliable people cannot be compromised and blackmailed into working 
for hostile intelligence services. The third task is communications security — to 
prevent deliberate or unintended leaks of sensitive information. This includes 
ensuring the use of proper voice procedures, codes, cyphers and scramblers; 
checking that codes and cyphers are changed frequently and have not been 
broken; "sweeping" buildings for wiretaps and "bugs"; ensuring that "loose 
talk" is minimized and that classified waste is destroyed. No system is 
foolproof, of course, and the security service must respond if it suspects that a 
government department or agency has been penetrated. Where the target is the 
intelligence community itself, the methods of uncovering a mole are essentially 
two: first, an internal inquiry, a time-consuming process which could involve 
retracing the course of all "blown" operations, debriefing exposed agents and 
informers, searching for disinformation clues and the re-vetting of all personnel 
— including interrogation of likely suspects. But, as the hunter and the hunted 
may be one and the same, there is no guarantee of success. The mole, of all 
possible suspects, will have an airtight alibi. The second method is to penetrate 
the hostile service, using the information gathered there to identify and elim-
inate the double agent in one's own. Quite apart from the length of time such 
penetration takes, perhaps years, it is by far the more dangerous operation: the 
enemy will be expecting it, watching for it, especially if they have an agent in 
place to warn them in advance. Once the mole is uncovered, some "cleaning of 
the Augean Stables" will be required. The kind of wholesale reorganization 
suggested by Ricki Tarr probably would be unnecessarily extreme. But even a 
limited internal purge of key personnel would disrupt normal operations for a 
considerable period. 
Were counter-espionage the only task of a security service, its job would be 
difficult enough. But in the 1960's and '70's security services in western countries 
were drawn increasingly into the "gray areas" of counter-subversion and 
anti-terrorist operations. Here they confronted a major dilemma. The societies 
they are sworn to protect are open, with relative ease of access to information 
and especially to people. The organizations which threaten them are closed, 
compartmentalized, often armed and dangerous. They are generally skilled in 
penetration and in cloaking their intentions and activities in familiar innocent 
forms. 
Terrorism is a case in point. Surprise is crucial to successful terrorist opera-
tions, since by secretly choosing the time, place and manner of attack the 
terrorist hopes to neutralize the potentially greater strength of the security 
forces which will respond to his action.16 Furthermore, surprise is central to the 
psychological impact of terrorism, frequently the principal objective of 
terrorist operations.'7 Obviously, the most desirable, rational response is to 
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apprehend the terrorist prior to attack, but as Major-General Frank Kitson has 
observed, "the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding 
him."18 An efficient, effective terrorist organization will protect itself from such 
inquiry in two ways: first, by adopting a secure cellular structure which, by 
reducing internal personal connections, can minimize the hazards posed by the 
capture of any one member. For years this organizational form protected the 
Red Brigades from penetration by the Italian security services and in the latter 
half of the 1970's the Provisional IRA adopted a similar structural pattern.19 
The second way in which a terrorist organization may seek to protect itself is by 
penetrating the police intelligence and security services. By placing its own 
members or sympathisers within the anti-terrorist organization, the terrorists 
can be forewarned of impending security operations — and thereby frustrate or 
misdirect them — and can identify and eliminate key members of the security 
forces. Britain's "small wars of decolonization" provide many examples of such 
penetration and their disastrous consequences, and the accurate targeting of 
senior security personnel suggests that the Red Brigades have experienced some 
degree of success in penetrating their opponents.20 On the need for timely, 
accurate intelligence in order to pre-empt terrorist activities, and for an efficient 
security service to prevent penetration, nothing more need be said. 
In an open society, however, it may not be possible or even desirable to apply 
the same techniques to the rooting out of terrorism and subversion as are 
employed in counter-espionage, because the target of investigation is so 
different. In the case of the mole, security operations may be confined to the 
suspect service or department or directed only against the service of a hostile 
power. But in the case of subversion, and counter-terrorism, investigation is 
directed against part of the nation — the people the security service is supposed 
to protect. 
The definition of subversion is central to the problem. It is possible to provide 
a clinical, technical description of the process — action taken to acquire "dis-
guised but effective control over a population or group which is supposed to be 
under the control of some constituted authority."21 The subversives may use a 
combination of legal and clandestine illegal techniques to infiltrate and take 
control of institutions and organizations within society, with the aim of creating 
a "rival state" which can eventually challenge the power of the incumbent 
government. The security forces are probably the most important targets of 
subversion since, without them, a government is powerless to defend itself. It 
will not even know it is threatened until it is too late. But the identification of 
people and organizations engaged in subversion tends to be subjective. The 
process is open to abuse since the government or the security service may 
classify as subversive anyone they do not like. That leaves the way open for 
harassment of innocent people and legitimate groups, violations of privacy and 
the host of legal and moral questions that flow therefrom. Furthermore, once 
exposed, such abuses discredit the security service, with much the same 
consequences as the exposure of a mole. A discredited service cannot protect a 
society or itself and leaves both open to exploitation by hostile agents or genuine 
subversives. 
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Issues Demanding Answers 
The problems discussed above raise one basic question: can an open society 
defend itself against espionage, terrorism and subversion and still remain open? 
The author believes that an effective security service need not pose a threat to 
democracy. But if the freedoms we enjoy are to be preserved, governments 
might well address themselves to the following issues: 
1. How much secrecy is necessary? All governments tend to "overclassify" 
the paper they produce. A more selective approach to classification might have 
several beneficial effects. First, less classified material in circulation would mean 
fewer genuine and embarrassing leaks. Secondly, it would reduce the number of 
people, especially civil servants, who would have to be security cleared. That, in 
turn, would mean fewer background investigations, invasions of privacy and 
files on private citizens. Finally, it is easier to protect a smaller amount of 
classified material. This approach, combined with a greater effort to explain to 
the public the need for a degree of secrecy — in short, explaining the threat — 
and the role of the security service, might produce security, administrative and 
civil liberties benefits. 
2. Who is responsible? A security or intelligence service which is out of 
control is a menace to the society it is intended to protect. There must be a 
clearly defined chain of command and responsibility to senior officers of the 
service and to their political masters, who should be held accountable to the 
elected body in which they represent the public. If some degree of supervision is 
deemed necessary, to prevent and to examine abuses, then the composition of 
any commission should be a matter for careful consideration. A panel of politi-
cians may not be the best safeguard either of civil liberties or of internal security. 
3. Overt versus Covert Operations — The nature of espionage, subversion 
and terrorism demand some covert counter-measures. But, as stated earlier, an 
efficient service will devote the largest proportion of its efforts to overt opera-
tions and should not have to cast its net too wide in the covert sector. Where 
undercover operations are deemed essential, however, security services require 
clear directives as to what is and what is not legally permissible. Furthermore, 
they should not be required to break the law in order to enforce it since, quite 
apart from the legal and moral questions, violent, subversive, conspiratorial 
activity is incompatible with the methodical task of collecting and processing 
information which lies at the heart of security intelligence work.22 
4. Separation of Powers — Policy-makers might consider whether the same 
organization should be responsible for collecting and analysing security 
intelligence and for exploiting it. Clearly, such an arrangement presents a 
potential danger of a service making work for itself. Law enforcement is a police 
responsibility which should not be shared with a security service, whose task is 
essentially investigative. 
A liberal democracy will never be completely secure from the threats of 
espionage, terrorism and subversion. That is the price it pays for remaining an 
open society. But attention to and, if necessary, positive action on the issues out-
lined above should go some way to striking a balance between personal liberties 
and national security. 
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